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Abstract. We propose a quantum key distribution protocol with quan-
tum based user authentication. Our protocol is the first one in which
users can authenticate each other without previously shared secret and
then securely distribute a key where the key may not be exposed to even
a trusted third party. The security of our protocol is guaranteed by the
properties of the entanglement.
1 Introduction
Quantum key distribution(QKD) is the most actively researched field in Quan-
tum Cryptography. Since BB84 protocol[1] was proposed by Bennett and Bras-
sard in 1984 as a start, many QKD protocols have been proposed[2–4] and
implemented[5–7]. The great advantage of QKD is to provide the provable secu-
rity of distributed keys[8–10]. However, it is assumed that the quantum channel
is directly connected and previously authorized to the designated users in those
protocols. This assumption is not suitable on the consideration of quantum net-
works. To authenticate users on the quantum networks, Quantum Authentica-
tion protocols[11–18] are proposed since Crepeau and L. Salvail first proposed
a quantum identification protocol in 1995. Some Quantum Authentication pro-
tocols assume that the users have some authentication information such as en-
tangled states[11–13] and authentication sequence[14, 15]. As mentioned above,
these protocols can not be operated on the quantum networks. Other quantum
authentication protocols[16–18] introduced a trusted third party. Quantum au-
thentication protocols proposed by Zeng and Zhang[16] in 2000 and Mihara[17]
in 2002 are only for authentication. Alice and Bob can authenticate each other
and distribute key without previously shared information only in one protocol
proposed by Ljunggren and et al.[18]. The major disadvantage of this protocol
is the leakage of the key to the trusted third party.
In this paper, we propose a Quantum Key Distribution protocol with authen-
tication. The proper users, Alice and Bob can authenticate each other without
previously shared secret and share a secret key without leakage of information
2to anyone. We organize this paper as follows. First, we propose a new QKD pro-
tocol with user authentication in chapter 2. Our QKD protocol is composed of
two parts: one is authentication and the other key is distribution. Greenberger -
Horne - Zeilinger (GHZ) states[19] are used to authenticate users and distribute
a secret key. The security analysis of our protocol is discussed in chapter 3 and
at last our conclusion is presented in chapter 4.
2 Quantum Authentication and Quantum Key
Distribution protocol
2.1 Authentication
We assume that Alice and Bob do not share any prior secret information or
entanglement states for authentication. To identify each other in the communi-
cation, they are supposed to introduce a trusted third party, Trent. Trent plays
a role like a CA(certificate authority) in PKI(Public Key Infrastructure)[20, 21].
If there are n users in quantum networks, then n(n−1)2 keys are needed to com-
municate freely when there is no Trent. Besides, each user must distribute n− 1
secret keys with other users. However, only n keys are needed when Trent exists
and each user just needs to distribute one secret key with Trent. Trent may be a
loophole for security. However it can be overcome using similar methods applied
to CA.
We assume that Alice has registered her secret identity IDA and a one-way
hash function hA : {0, 1}∗×{0, 1}l → {0, 1}m, where ∗means an arbitrary length,
l is the length of a counter, and m is a constant. Bob has also registered his
secret identity IDB and a one-way hash function hB to Trent. This information
is assumed to be kept secret between the user and Trent. Authentication key
can, then, be generated by a hashed value huser(IDuser , cuser) where cuser is a
counter which is the number of the calls of the one way hash function huser .
If Alice wants to distribute a key with Bob, she notifies this fact to Bob
and Trent. On receiving the request, Trent generates N GHZ tripartite states
|Ψ〉 = |ψ1〉|ψ2〉...|ψN 〉. For simplicity the following GHZ state |ψi〉 is supposed
to be prepared.
|ψi〉 = 1√
2
(|000〉ATB + |111〉ATB)
where the subscripts A, T and B correspond to Alice, Trent, and Bob, respec-
tively. In this paper, we represent the z basis as {|0〉, |1〉} and the x basis as
{|+〉, |−〉}, where |+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉) and |−〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉).
Next, Trent encodes Alice’s and Bob’s particles of GHZ states with their
authentication keys, hA(IDA, cA) and hB(IDB, cB), respectively. For example,
if the ith value of hA(IDA, cA) is 0, then Trent makes an identity operation I
to Alice’s particle of the ith GHZ state. If it is 1, Hadamard operation H is
applied. If the authentication key does not have enough length to cover all GHZ
particles, new authentication keys can be created by increasing the counter until
the authentication keys shield all GHZ particles. After making operations on
3the GHZ particles, Trent distributes the states to Alice and Bob and keeps the
remaining for him.
Fig. 1. Procedures of Authentication 0. Alice and Bob register their secret identi-
ties and hash functions to Trent. 1. Trent generates GHZ states |ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|000〉ATB +
|111〉ATB). 2. Trent makes unitary operations on |ψ〉 with Alice’s and Bob’s authen-
tication key. 3. Trent distributes GHZ particles to Alice and Bob. 4. Alice and Bob
make reverse unitary operations on their qubits with their authentication key, respec-
tively. 5. Alice and Bob choose the position of a subset of GHZ states and make a local
measurement in the z basis on them and compare the results.
On receiving the qubits, Alice and Bob make reverse unitary operations on
their qubits with their authentication key hA(IDA, cA) and hB(IDB, cB), re-
spectively. This authentication procedure can be written in the following form
of sequences of local unitary operation, the initial state:
|ψi〉1 = 1√
2
(|000〉ATB + |111〉ATB)
state after Trent’s transformation
|ψi〉2 = {[1− hA(IDA, cA)]I + [hA(IDA, cA)]H}A
⊗ {[1− hB(IDB , cB)]I + [hB(IDB , cB)]H}B|ψi〉1
and finally the state after Alice’s and Bob’s local operations
|ψi〉3 = {[1− hA(IDA, cA)]I + [hA(IDAcA)]H}A
⊗ {[1− hB(IDB, cB)]I + [hB(IDB, cB)]H}B|ψi〉2
= |ψi〉1
4where |ψi〉 is the state of the i-th GHZ particle and the subscript 1, 2, and 3
represents the three steps of authentication.
Next, Alice and Bob select some of the decoded qubits, make von-Neumann
measurements on them, and compare the results through the public channel. If
the error rate is higher than expected, then Alice and Bob abort the protocol.
Otherwise they can confirm that the other party is legitimate and the channel
is secure. They then execute the following key distribution procedures.
2.2 Key Distribution
Alice and Bob randomly make an operation either identity operation I or Hadamard
operation H on the remaining GHZ particles. They keep the record of the oper-
ations which they made. For example, 0 represents I and 1 indicates H . After
making unitary operations, Bob sends his encrypted GHZ particles to Alice. On
receiving the qubits, Alice makes Bell measurements on pairs of particles con-
sisting of her qubit and Bob’s qubit. On the other hand, Trent measures his
third qubit in the x basis and reveals the measurement outcomes. In this paper
we use the following notations of Bell states.
|Φ+〉 = 1√
2
{|00〉+ |11〉}
|Φ−〉 = 1√
2
{|00〉 − |11〉}
|Ψ+〉 = 1√
2
{|01〉+ |10〉}
|Ψ−〉 = 1√
2
{|01〉 − |10〉}
Alice can infer Bob’s unitary operations and sometimes discover the existence
of Eve using the table [1]. For example, if Trent discloses |+〉, Alice chooses I
operation and her Bell measurement result is |Φ−〉, then Alice can infer that Bob
made a H operation and he sent 1. On the other hand, if Trent makes public
|+〉, Alice makes I operation and obtains |Ψ−〉, then Alice can detect an error.
Table 1. Operations on reversed GHZ states(i.e. |ψ〉) and published information
Operation Transformation of GHZ states
Alice Bob after Alice’s and Bob’s operations
I(0) I(0) 1√
2
(|Φ+〉AB|+〉a + |Φ
−〉AB |−〉a)
I(0) H(1) 1
2
(|Φ+〉AB |−〉a + |Φ
−〉AB |+〉a + |Ψ
+〉AB|+〉a + |Ψ
−〉AB |−〉a)
H(1) I(0) 1
2
(|Φ+〉AB |−〉a + |Φ
−〉AB |+〉a + |Ψ
+〉AB|+〉a − |Ψ
−〉AB |−〉a)
H(1) H(1) 1√
2
(|Φ+〉AB |+〉a + |Ψ
+〉AB|−〉a)
5Fig. 2. Procedures of Key distribution 1. Alice and Bob make identity opera-
tions I (0) or Hadamard operations H (1) randomly on the remaining GHZ particles
after authentication. 2. Bob sends his encoded particles to Alice. 3. Alice makes Bell
measurements on pairs of particles consisting of her qubit and Bob’s qubit. 4. The
arbitrator measures his qubits in the x basis and publishes the results. 5. Alice infers
Bob’s operation using the table [1]. 6. Alice and Bob select check bits and compare
them.
Alice and Bob compare some bits of their shared key (Bob’s operation se-
quence). If the error rate is higher than the acceptable level, they throw away
the shared sequence and restart the protocol. Otherwise they use the remaining
sequences as a secret key. Usual error correction can be implemented to correct
the remaining errors. Alice and Bob can reduce the Eve’s knowledge of a shared
key by standard privacy amplification[22, 23].
3 Security Analysis
In the assumption, user identity and a hash function are enrolled to Trent and the
information is kept secret only between the owners and the arbitrator. Moreover
Trent is supposed to be a honest person whom Alice and Bob can trust.
We first analyze the process of authentication. Suppose Eve intercepts the
qubits heading to Alice or Bob and disguises her or him. Let Eve use the following
unitary operation UAE on Alice’s and her qubit |e〉.
UAE |0e〉AE = α|0〉A|e00〉E + β|1〉A|e01〉E
UAE|1e〉AE = β′|0〉A|e10〉E + α′|1〉A|e11〉E
where |α|2 + |β|2 = 1, |α′|2 + |β′|2 = 1 and αβ∗ + α′∗β′ = 0. If a bit of Alice’s
authentication key is 0 (1), the total states |ξ0〉 (or |ξ1〉) of system and Eve’s
6probe after Alice’s and Bob’s reverse operation is as follows.
|ξ0〉 = UAE{ 1√
2
(|000〉ATB + |111〉ATB)}|e〉E
=
1√
2
{α|000〉ATB|e00〉E + β|100〉ATB|e01〉E
+ β′|011〉ATB|e10〉E + α′|111〉ATB|e11〉E}
|ξ1〉 = HAUAE{HA 1√
2
(|000〉ATB + |111〉ATB)}|e〉E
=
1
2
√
2
{|000〉ATB(α|e00〉E + β|e01〉E + β′|e10〉E + α′|e11〉E)
+|001〉ATB(α|e00〉E − β|e01〉E + β′|e10〉E − α′|e11〉E)
+|110〉ATB(α|e00〉E + β|e01〉E − β′|e10〉E − α′|e11〉E)
+|111〉ATB(α|e00〉E − β|e01〉E − β′|e10〉E + α′|e11〉E)}
Eve can be detected with probability 1+β
2+β′2
4 (when the probability of 0 and
1 in an authentication key is same) in the authentication phase. If the number
of the check bits in the authentication process is c, then Alice and Bob can find
out the existence of Eve with probability of 1 − (1+α2+α′24 )c. Eve is, therefore,
always revealed if c is large enough. Hence if the authentication is passed, then
Alice and Bob confirm the other party is the designated user.
Moreover, the original secret identities of users cannot be revealed even if Eve
estimates some bits of the authentication key i.e. the hashed value. Eve can infer
only some bits of the authentication key by checking bits in the authentication
process. However Eve cannot reverse the hash function with partial information
of the hashed value obtained from the checking bits in the authentication process.
Besides Eve cannot infer the next authentication key since it is used only once
and changed every time.
After authentication process, only Bob’s qubits are transmitted. Eve will
make operations on these qubits in key distribution phase. Suppose Eve use the
above unitary operation UBE on Bob’s and her qubit |E〉. Then we can get the
following states of total system composed by Alice, Bob, Trent and Eve. Equation
(1) is derived from the situation when Alice and Bob choose I, equation (2) when
they apply different unitary operations(H and I), and equation (3) is when they
make H operations.
(1) 1
2
√
2
[
|Φ+〉AB
{|+〉T (α|e00〉E + α′|e11〉E) + |−〉T (α|e00〉E − α′|e11〉E)
}
+ |Φ−〉AB
{|+〉T (α|e00〉E − α′|e11〉E) + |−〉T (α|e00〉E + α′|e11〉E)
}
+ |Ψ+〉AB
{|+〉T (β|e01〉E + β′|e10〉E) + |−〉T (β|e01〉E − β′|e10〉E)
}
+ |Ψ−〉AB
{|+〉T (β|e01〉E − β′|e10〉E) + |−〉T (β|e01〉E + β′|e10〉E)
}]
7(2) 14
[
|Φ+〉AB
{|+〉T (α|e00〉E − α′|e11〉E + β|e01〉E + β′|e10〉E)
+ |−〉T (α|e00〉E + α′|e11〉E ∓ β|e01〉E ± β′|e10〉E)
}
+|Φ−〉AB
{|+〉T (α|e00〉E + α′|e11〉E − β|e01〉E + β′|e10〉E)
+ |−〉T (α|e00〉E − α′|e11〉E ± β|e01〉E ± β′|e10〉E)
}
+|Ψ+〉AB
{|+〉T (α|e00〉E + α′|e11〉E + β|e01〉E − β′|e10〉E)
+ |−〉T (∓α|e00〉E ± α′|e11〉E + β|e01〉E + β′|e10〉E)
}
+|Ψ−〉AB
{|+〉T (−α|e00〉E + α′|e11〉E + β|e01〉E + β′|e10〉E)
+ |−〉T (±α|e00〉E ± α′|e11〉E + β|e01〉E − β′|e10〉E)
}]
(3) 1
2
√
2
[
|Φ+〉AB
{|+〉T (α|e00〉E + α′|e11〉E) + |−〉T (β|e01〉E + β′|e10〉E)
}
+ |Φ−〉AB
{|+〉T (α|e00〉E − α′|e11〉E)− |−〉T (β|e01〉E − β′|e10〉E)
}
+ |Ψ+〉AB
{|+〉T (β|e01〉E + β′|e10〉E) + |−〉T (α|e00〉E + α′|e11〉E)
}
+ |Ψ−〉AB
{|+〉T (β|e01〉E − β′|e10〉E)− |−〉T (α|e00〉E − α′|e11〉E)
}]
As shown in the above equations, Eve can be detected with probability 12 +
β2+β′2
8 per check bit in the key distribution phase. Hence Eve can be detected
with certainly if enough check bits are used in the key distribution. In this regard,
Alice and Bob can identify and securely distribute a key with certainty using
our protocol.
4 Conclusions
We propose a quantum key distribution protocol with quantum based user au-
thentication. User authentication is executed without previously shared secret
and by validating the correlation of GHZ states. A key can be securely distributed
by using the remaining GHZ states after authentication. By the properties of
the entanglement of GHZ states, even the trusted third party, Trent can not
get out the distributed key. We expect our protocol can well be adjusted to be
incorporated in future quantum networks.
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